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SNPeek (side-channel research)

What it is

SNPeek is Google Research's published side-channel analysis of AMD SEV-SNP — full title SNPeek: Side-Channel Analysis for Privacy Applications on Confidential VMs. The work demonstrates that real-world privacy applications running inside SEV-SNP CVMs can leak information through microarchitectural side-channels, despite the TEE's nominal isolation guarantees.

Significance for production privacy architectures

The 2026-05-27 Google zero-trust-aggregation post cites SNPeek as evidence that TEE-only privacy architectures are structurally exposed to ongoing side-channel discovery:

"Researchers regularly discover side-channel vulnerabilities that can be leveraged by an attacker to either invalidate TEE guarantees, or application-level specific guarantees (SNPeek, TDXray)."

This is the explicit motivation for adding the cryptographic defense-in-depth layer in the 2026 Google federated-analytics architecture: cryptography-plus-TEE defense in depth is the architectural response to the kind of risk SNPeek demonstrates.

Caveats

  • Stub wiki page. The research details (specific side-channel mechanisms, severity, mitigations) live in the published paper; this page exists primarily to record the citation context within the wiki's TEE-side-channel-vulnerability discussion.
  • Sibling to TDXray which applies the same research approach to Intel TDX.

Seen in

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