--- title: Kafka's log compaction corrupts data. Here's how we fixed it source: Redpanda Blog source_slug: redpanda url: https://www.redpanda.com/blog/kafka-log-compaction-bug-fix-streaming published: 2026-06-25 fetched: 2026-06-26T14:01:01+00:00 ingested: true --- In compacted topics, Apache Kafka® retains only the latest value for each key. _Tombstones_ (records with a null value) can be used to express a deletion of a key. Once compaction has deleted all the value records, Kafka waits for at least `delete.retention.ms` and removes tombstones as well. This approach prevents bloating the topic with tombstones for long-gone keys. But there’s a problem (actually, there are four). In this post, we describe the bug we found and how coordinated compaction solves it in [Redpanda Streaming](https://www.redpanda.com/data-streaming). ## How Kafka log compaction works To understand the problem, here’s a brief explanation of how Kafka’s log compaction currently works. Compaction affects _transaction control batches_. In a transactional write, a producer first writes the data records (possibly across several partitions), then appends a COMMIT or ABORT control batch to each partition. Consumers running with `isolation.level=read_committed` use those markers to decide whether to deliver the transaction's records or hide them. Control batches sit in the log like ordinary records, and in a compacted topic, compaction applies the same expiration-based rules to them: once the data they resolve has been compacted and enough time has passed, the marker can be removed as well. This allows efficient cleanup of old data and metadata. Not only are data records and tombstones for removed keys compacted away, but also associated transaction control batches. Tombstones and COMMIT/ABORT control batches are the only**** signals that their associated records were deleted, committed, or aborted, respectively. Once a tombstone or a control batch is compacted away, this information is gone. This can lead to catastrophic consequences: compaction may remove a tombstone or a control batch on one replica while another still needs it. Each broker compacts its own log independently. A replica that lacks a tombstone or marker still retains associated records. When it rejoins, the leader no longer has the tombstone or the marker to replicate. The replicas then permanently disagree about what's in the log, and which version a consumer sees depends on which broker is the leader at read time. The bug reproduces reliably on Kafka 3.9 through 4.2. We've found four variants, ranging from "deleted data reappears" to "aborted data is served as committed". Next, we’ll describe all four, walk through a reproducer for one of them, and explain how we closed the gap. ## The root cause: compaction–replication race When a broker falls behind or goes offline, it drops out of the ISR (in-sync replica set). Meanwhile, the remaining brokers keep accepting writes and keep compacting as usual. If a critical record (tombstone, COMMIT marker, or ABORT marker) is written while one replica is unavailable—and compaction removes it before the replica catches up—the replica never learns about it. From its point of view, the record never existed. Kafka's safeguards are time-based. A tombstone becomes removable `delete.retention.ms` (default 24 hours) after it is written. For transaction control batches, cleanup happens in two steps: 1. After `delete.retention.ms`, the marker batch itself is replaced by an empty batch that still carries the producer ID and the COMMIT/ABORT flag in its header. 2. After `producer.id.expiration.ms` (also 24 hours by default, timed from the last producer activity), the empty batch may also be discarded. A broker that's offline or lagging past these timers (due to a hardware failure, a long maintenance window, or a slow recovery) will miss both the marker and its empty-batch remnant, with no way to recover. We observed four manifestations of this problem, depending on which metadata record is lost. Each scenario below involves a 3-broker cluster in which Broker 2 goes offline for a prolonged period. ### Issue 1: Tombstone divergence, deleted data reappears A tombstone for key K is written while Broker 2 is down. Brokers 1 and 3 compact away both the original value and the tombstone. When Broker 2 rejoins, there is no tombstone left to replicate, so it keeps the original record. Brokers 1 and 3 consider K deleted; Broker 2 serves K=V. Which one a consumer sees depends on who the leader is. ### Issue 2: Aborted-to-committed, aborted data served as committed A producer does two transactions with the same `transactional.id`: 1. TX1: produce `poison=SHOULD_NOT_SEE_THIS`, then **ABORT**. 2. TX2: produce `good=data`, then **COMMIT**. If Broker 2 misses the ABORT marker for TX1 and it's compacted away on other brokers, Broker 2 still has the poison data in its log. When it rebuilds its transaction state, the next control batch from the same producer is TX2's COMMIT, and Broker 2 applies it to TX1's data too. The poison record is then served to `read_committed` consumers as valid, committed data. Data the application explicitly rolled back is delivered to downstream systems as real, and nothing in Kafka flags it. ### Issue 3: Committed-to-aborted, committed data hidden Similar to the issue above. The producer commits some good data in TX1, then produces some garbage and aborts in TX2. If Broker 2 misses the COMMIT marker for TX1 and it's compacted away, then when Broker 2 sees TX2's ABORT it applies it to TX1's data. Committed data is reclassified as aborted and disappears from `read_committed` consumers. ### Issue 4: Stuck partition, `READ_COMMITTED` frozen A producer begins a transaction, writes K=V, and commits. The COMMIT marker tells `read_committed` consumers that the data is now visible. If Broker 2 misses the COMMIT marker and it's later compacted away together with its empty-batch remnant, Broker 2 still has the transactional data but does not know the transaction was finished. It treats the data as uncommitted and pins its Last Stable Offset (LSO) at that offset. When Broker 2 becomes leader, `read_committed` consumers see nothing past that point: the partition is frozen for them even as data keeps being written to it. The pin lasts until Broker 2's own `producer.id.expiration.m`s elapses from the last record of that producer in the log — 24 hours by default, and effectively indefinite if the same producer keeps writing new transactions that refresh the PID's last-activity timestamp. ## Reproducing the bug step-by-step Reproducer scripts are in the [companion GitHub repo](https://github.com/redpanda-data-blog/kafka-log-compaction-bug-fix), all you need is Docker Compose. Each `diverge.sh` script accepts a command-line argument to tune Kafka so that it takes less time to reproduce. With default settings, it will take about two days. This is how to run the aborted-to-committed variant with a lower `delete.retention.ms` in automated mode: git clone https://github.com/redpanda-data-blog/kafka-log-compaction-bug-fix.git cd kafka-log-compaction-bug-fix/kafka-compaction-divergence/aborted-to-committed ./diverge.sh 10m # aggressive compaction settings, aim to complete in 10 minutes You can also run it step by step. First, source the setup: it pulls in the helper functions used below, and defines the test-time-scaled values. git clone https://github.com/redpanda-data-blog/kafka-log-compaction-bug-fix.git cd kafka-log-compaction-bug-fix/kafka-compaction-divergence/aborted-to-committed source ./setup.sh 10m Start a fresh 3-broker cluster: docker compose down --volumes 2>/dev/null docker compose up -d sleep 10 Create a compacted topic. The only override is delete.retention.ms (default 24 hours, scaled down from the test duration by setup.sh): kafka_topics --create --topic foo --partitions 1 --replication-factor 3 \ --config cleanup.policy=compact \ --config delete.retention.ms=$DELETE_RETENTION_MS Start the Python producer (it uses `confluent-kafka`, baked into the `txproducer` image via [txproducer.Dockerfile](https://github.com/redpanda-data-blog/kafka-log-compaction-bug-fix/blob/main/kafka-compaction-divergence/txproducer.Dockerfile)). It begins TX1, produces `key=poison` `value=SHOULD_NOT_SEE_THIS`, then waits: docker compose exec -d txproducer python3 /scripts/aborted-to-committed.py wait_for_signal tx1_produced Verify that all three brokers have the transactional data in their ISR. Broker 2 now has the poison record in its log, unresolved: while ! kafka_topics --describe --topic foo | grep -qP 'Isr:\s*[123],[123],[123]'; do sleep 1; done Move all `__transaction_state` leaders off Broker 2 first (otherwise, if Broker 2 happens to host our `transactional.id`'s coordinator, the upcoming commit will hang on coordinator failover). Then kill Broker 2 and wait for leadership of the `foo` partition to move off it. Broker 2 will miss everything that follows: move_tx_coord_off 2 docker compose kill kafka2 while [ "$(get_leader)" = "2" ]; do sleep 1; done Signal the producer to abort TX1. Only brokers 1 and 3 receive the ABORT marker: docker compose exec -T txproducer touch /tmp/signals/do_abort wait_for_signal tx1_aborted 180 Pump ~1GB of filler to force a segment roll, wait `delete.retention.ms` for the ABORT marker to become removable, pump another 1GB, then run a few extra cycles to let the cleaner remove the aborted data, the ABORT marker record, and the empty batch it leaves behind: pump_1gb; sleep "$SLEEP_S"; pump_1gb while [ "$(kafka_consume "$BOOTSTRAP" read_uncommitted | grep -c '^poison')" -gt 0 ]; do pump_1gb; sleep 15 done for i in 1 2 3 4 5; do pump_1gb; sleep 15; done Signal the producer to produce TX2 (`key=good value=data`) and commit: docker compose exec -T txproducer touch /tmp/signals/do_tx2 wait_for_signal tx2_committed At this point, the COMMIT marker for TX2 is fresh in the log on brokers 1 and 3. On those brokers, a `read_committed` consumer sees `good=data` and nothing with poison: kafka_consume "kafka1:9092,kafka3:9092" read_committed | grep "^poison" # no output; correctly aborted Now bring Broker 2 back, wait for it to rejoin the ISR, and force leadership to it: docker compose start kafka2 while ! kafka_topics --describe --topic foo | grep -qP 'Isr:\s*[123],[123],[123]'; do sleep 1; done force_leader 2 Read from Broker 2 with `read_committed`: kafka_consume "kafka2:9092" read_committed | grep "^poison" # poison SHOULD_NOT_SEE_THIS Broker 2 still has the poison data in its log. When it rebuilt its transaction state, the first control batch it saw from that producer was TX2's COMMIT, so it treats TX1's data as committed. The application aborted TX1, yet consumers reading through Broker 2 get the poison record as valid data. Same topic, same partition, same log contents on disk, but `read_committed` consumers see different results depending on which broker they read from. ## The Redpanda Streaming solution: coordinated compaction Redpanda Streaming respects `delete.retention.ms`. Without it, a slow consumer could see an earlier value for a key but miss its tombstone or transaction marker if that was removed in the meantime. But there's no guarantee that a replica will not be offline or lagging for longer than `delete.retention.ms`. To behave correctly even during prolonged broker outages or slowness, Redpanda runs a small coordination protocol on top of compaction that keeps a tombstone or control marker in place until every replica has compacted the associated data records. ### The protocol for tombstone removal Coordinated Compaction uses two values per partition: * **MCCO (maximum cleanly compacted offset)** , per replica. Each replica tracks the offset up to which its own log has been cleanly compacted: no duplicate keys below this point, at most one value or a tombstone for each key. MCCO only moves forward: once data is cleanly compacted, it stays compacted. Compaction only works below the high watermark, so MCCO cannot be truncated by replication. * **MTRO (maximum tombstone removal offset)** , per replica set. The leader computes MTRO as the minimum MCCO across all replicas, including ones that are currently unavailable (using their last-known MCCO). So MTRO cannot advance past an offline replica's compaction progress. A tombstone below MTRO is safe to remove: every replica has already compacted past the earlier values it supersedes, so no replica can be left serving a deleted key. The protocol works in two phases: 1. **Collection.** The leader periodically asks each follower: "What's your MCCO?" Followers report their local compaction progress. 2. **Distribution.** The leader computes MTRO = min (all MCCOs) and pushes it back to every replica. Each replica then knows the safe upper bound for removing tombstones. _Coordinated compaction protocol flow_ Every replica now knows that records at offsets below 80 are safe to remove, and records at 80 or above must be kept until compaction on the slowest replica catches up. ### Handling edge cases **Leadership changes.** When a new leader is elected, the new leader uses the previously distributed MTRO value as its starting point. It then begins collecting MCCOs from all followers to compute a fresh MTRO. The new leader re-broadcasts MTRO even if the value hasn't changed, since followers may have missed the last update during leadership transition. **Replication membership changes.** When a replica is added to the group, its MCCO is initialized to the group's current MTRO. MCCO may go above the replica's local log end, which looks odd but is correct: the new replica will receive its log from another replica that's already cleanly compacted up to MTRO. When a replica is removed, MTRO may advance since the departed replica's MCCO might be the lowest of all. **MTRO never goes backward.** Once a cleanup decision is made, it's permanent. Attempts to move MTRO backward (for example, by a late RPC from a previous leader) are ignored. ### The protocol for transaction marker removal A similar pair of offsets is maintained to guard transaction marker deletion: * **MXFO (Maximum transaction-free offset)** , per replica. The offset up to which this replica has fully resolved transaction state: every producer's transactions below it are committed or aborted, and none are still ongoing. Like MCCO, MXFO only moves forward. * **MXRO (Maximum transaction-marker removal offset)** , per replica set. The minimum MXFO across all replicas (including unavailable ones, via their last-known value). A COMMIT/ABORT marker is safe to remove once it is below MXRO, as every replica has processed all markers and resolved all transactions below MXRO. ### Data safety comes first. Cleanup is best-effort Even if a replica stays offline for a period of time, MTRO/MXRO do not move forward, so tombstone and marker removal above those offsets pauses across the cluster. This is an intentional design choice: correctness is a guarantee, compaction is best-effort. Once the replica rejoins and compacts, its MCCO/MXFO advances, the leader recomputes MTRO/MXRO, and cleanup resumes. ## Compaction without compromise The coordinated compaction algorithm allows Redpanda Streaming to make optimal cleanup decisions even under extreme conditions, such as heavy load or prolonged node outage. Brokers collectively determine which records can be deleted and free as much storage space as possible without compromising data safety. If you have questions about anything in this blog, just ask in the [Redpanda Community on Slack](https://redpanda.com/slack). If you’re interested in more behind-the-scenes work from Redpanda engineers, browse our latest blogs: > ‍ _A genuine thanks to our engineers Nicolae Vartolomei and Willem Kaufmann for reproducing the erroneous behavior in Kafka._