CONCEPT Cited by 1 source
Route Origin Validation (ROV)¶
Route Origin Validation is the BGP speaker-side process of
checking each received route against
RPKI-signed Route Origin Authorizations
(ROAs). If the route's origin AS matches a ROA for the prefix
(and the prefix length is within the ROA's maxLength), the
route is valid. Otherwise it's invalid (rejected) or
unknown (passed through, typically).
State machine¶
Three outcomes per inbound route:
- Valid — origin AS + prefix + length all match an extant ROA. Route is eligible for best-path selection.
- Invalid — the origin AS is in conflict with a ROA (e.g.
ROA says
AS64500 maxLength 24but route is originated byAS64501, or prefix is more-specific thanmaxLength). Standard practice: reject. - NotFound / Unknown — no ROA exists for this prefix. Accept by default (deployment still incremental).
What it catches, what it misses¶
Catches: route misorigination / hijacks — an AS claiming to originate a prefix it has no right to.
Misses: - Route leaks where the origin is correct but the path is not (the AS8048 → AS21980 case in the Venezuela post). ROV only validates the rightmost AS in the AS path; it does not validate the intermediate hops. For path checking you need path validation via ASPA. - An attacker forging a path that ends with the legitimate origin ASN but inserts themselves earlier; ROV passes them through because the origin looks correct.
Deployment status¶
ROV deployment is a multi-year collaborative lift. Cloudflare operates isbgpsafeyet.com to track public ROV deployment per AS. Sparkle (AS6762) was marked unsafe at the time of the Venezuela post (incomplete deployment per APNIC stats) and was marked safe on 2026-02-03 — unrelated to the 01-02 leak, which was a path anomaly not an origin anomaly.
Seen in¶
- sources/2026-01-08-cloudflare-a-closer-look-at-a-bgp-anomaly-in-venezuela — the ROV-vs-path-validation distinction is the core technical argument pushing back on the newsletter's framing of Sparkle's missing ROV as germane to the leak.